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LIST OF THE PARTIES 
The following are a list of all the parties to the proceeding in district court: 
1. Rhonda H. Malloy, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dan 
Malloy, PlaintifEAppellant 
2. Mary Beth Malloy, Defendant/Appellee 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Appellee agrees as to the Statement of the Issues as indicated by Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is about whether Mary Malloy, the ex-wife of a deceased federal employee, 
Dan Malloy, has the right to keep proceeds paid to her from her ex-husbands life insurance 
policy even though the deceased had subsequently married Rhonda Malloy and never changed 
the designation of beneficiary on his policy. Mary Malloy was married to Dan Malloy for nearly 
25 years. They had been divorced for two years when Dan married Rhonda. Dan then died three 
years later. His widow, Rhonda became the personal representative and heir to his estate. 
In 1989, Dan obtained a life insurance policy through the Federal Employees Group Life 
Insurance ("FEGLI") in the amount of $50,000. He designated Mary Beth as the beneficiary of 
the policy. After Dan's death, Mary Beth was paid $50,000 by FEGLI. Rhonda also sought the 
proceeds of the policy, but was denied because she was not the designated beneficiary of the 
policy. Rhonda then commenced suit against Mary Beth to recover the proceeds of the policy 
because she felt that she was entitled to the proceeds instead of Mary Beth. 
The district court case was commenced under the case number 100904217 on June 2, 
2010. (R. 1-10.) The causes of action by Rhonda against Mary Beth were for breach of contract, 
civil contempt, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment under Utah 
code Ann. § 75-2-804. (R. 1-10.) Both sides filed motions for summary judgment and the court 
heard oral argument on April 6,2011. (R. 58,100,227.) Both sides' arguments were based on 
the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804, wherein the legislature has indicated that 
revocation of former spouse as a beneficiary automatically occurs upon divorce unless a 
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governing instrument expressly indicates otherwise. Rhonda claimed that there was no express 
language that indicated that automatic revocation did not occur. Mary Beth claimed that there 
was express language that invalidated automatic revocation. Further Mary Beth also claimed that 
FEGLI policies were preempted by federal law and that Utah code could not affect the 
administration of FEGLI benefits. (R. 227.) 
During the course of the briefing for the motions for summary judgment, Mary Beth 
submitted a policy, a policy handbook or manual, a copy of the original signed designation of 
beneficiary form indicating Mary Beth as the beneficiary, a copy of the form policy holders sign 
to obtain insurance, several printouts from the website of the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management ("OPM"), the government agency responsible for administrating the benefits of 
federal employees, and an Affidavit by Counsel explaining how he obtained all of the above 
mentioned documents. (R. 76,126,240.) During the supplemental briefing, Rhonda objected to 
the use of all documents except the insurance policy and based her objection on a lack of 
foundation and authenticity. (R. 228.) 
After taking the matter under advisement and requesting additional briefing as to the 
preemption issue, the trial judge ruled in Mary Beth's favor finding that she was the rightful 
beneficiary of the proceeds of the FEGLI policy and that there was express language that 
invalidated any automatic revocation of a beneficiary. (R. 273,278.)Further, the trial court 
dismissed all of Rhonda's claims against Mary Beth with prejudice. (R. 278.) The trial court did 
not directly address the issue of preemption in its ruling. However, by the nature of its ruling, the 
trial court did not find that Utah Code provided a private cause of action for an estate of a 
deceased against a beneficiary of a FEGLI policy, otherwise, the court would not have ruled as it 
did. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVENT AND DISPUTED FACTS 
Appellee agrees with the statements of facts in paragraphs 1,2, 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11, 
12,13,14,15,18,19,20,21,23,24,26. 
Appellee disagrees with the statements of facts in paragraphs 16,17,22,25. A further 
explanation of disputed facts is described paragraph by paragraph in more detail below. 
16. Appellee disagrees with the assertions of fact in this paragraph that Mary Beth's 
exhibits were not properly authenticated and lacked foundation because all documents and/or 
exhibits were properly authenticated and had foundation. 
17. Appellee disagrees with the assertions of fact in this paragraph that Mary Beth's 
exhibits were unsupported because all exhibits submitted were supported. 
22. Appellee disagrees with the assertions that Manual and Master Policy lacked 
foundation and were not authenticated. Appellant made objections at the hearing as to these 
issues, but any objections were either ignored or denied by the trial judge because foundation 
was provided and the documents were authenticated. 
25. Appellee disagrees with the assertions that no other support was provided for the 
Manual or Master Policy documents other than statements from counsel for Mary Beth. 
Appellant provided the website address and the name and email account from the government 
agent that provided the documents to him. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mary Beth was entitled to receive the proceeds of the FEGLI policy because it was 
undisputed that she was the only designated beneficiary that Dan Malloy ever chose and Dan 
never submitted any document to ORS to indicate otherwise as required by FEGLI. Further, the 
3 
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FEGLI policy expressly indicated in multiple places that the designation of beneficiary would 
not automatically revoke due to a divorce or any other major life change. The designation of 
beneficiary form expressly informed Dan Malloy that if he wished to change a beneficiary, he 
would have to submit another form and warned him that if a life change occurred, such as 
divorce, only another properly submitted form would accomplish such a desire. These 
instructions are contained in manual and the beneficiary designation form. 
Further, the Manual and all other relevant forms are incorporated by reference into the 
contract agreed to by Dan Malloy. The provisions of Utah Code specifically state that automatic 
revision as a beneficiary occurs upon divorce "except as provided by the express terms of a 
governing instrument." The definition of a "governing instrument" is broad and includes any 
dispositive document. 
Also, any objection as to authenticity is unsustainable because the manual and supporting 
documents are official publications and readily available to the public on the ORS website. 
Official publications are self-authenticating. See Utah Rules of Evidence 902(5). Further, the 
Affidavit provided by counsel stating where he obtained the documents, what version, and 
providing printouts of additional publications showing that no revisions as to relevant terms of 
the policy provided a sufficient foundation for the exhibits to be accepted by the trial judge. 
Therefore, the trial court properly found that the Manual and the Beneficiary Designation Forms 
were governing instruments that expressly negated an automatic revocation of Mary Beth's 
status as the designated beneficiary. 
Finally, the administration of a FEGLIA policy regarding designation of beneficiaries is 
preempted by federal law and Utah Code § 75-2-804 cannot effect a change in beneficiaries. 
Therefore, due to all of these reasons; the trial court was correct in ruling in favor of Mary Beth. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Did Not Err in Finding that the Insurance Manual was a 
"Governing Instrument" under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804. 
The District Court was correct in finding that the insurance manual, along with other 
supporting documents were "governing instruments" that determined whether or not one's status 
as a beneficiary is automatically terminated by divorce pursuant to Utah Code § 75-2-804. When 
the court decided to accept the insurance manual as a "governing instrument", it stated the reason 
being that the manual was incorporated into the policy by reference. 
The policy in this dispute is for a Federal Group Life Insurance Policy ("FEGLI Policy"). 
This policy is governed by the Federal Group Life Insurance Act ("FEGLIA"). Under FEGLIA, 
the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") administers FEGLI policies to federal employees, 
but does not issue individual policies to each employee. See 5 U.S.C. § 8709. Employees who 
enroll in the FEGLI program file a standard form ("SF 2817"), see (R. 249), with their employer 
as well as a designation of beneficiary form ("SF 2823"). (R. 178-179.) Included as part of the 
SF 2817 executed by employees enrolling in FEGLIA, are instructions to the employee which 
incorporate by reference the FEGLI Handbook (RJ 76-21) which also happens to be the 
"Insurance Manual" of this dispute. (R. 76-.) 
The Handbook expressly negates automatic revocation by divorce and is incorporated 
into a governing instrument executed by the deceased at the time he enrolled in FEGLI benefits. 
It should also be noted that the deceased or enroUee never actually signs the policy; however, the 
policy is incorporated by reference just like the insurance manual in the same documents that the 
deceased actual signs. Further, not only does the "Insurance Manual" indicate that automatic 
revision does not occur upon divorce, but also the beneficiary designation form indicates this too. 
5 
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Further, Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(19) is broad enough to include documents such as 
the manual or executed forms as a "governing instrument." The statute allows for "a dispositive, 
appointive, or normative instrument of any similar type." See Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(19) 
(emphasis added). The beneficiary designation form and the enrollment form are both part of the 
insurance policy because they are the only documents ever actually executed to gain the benefit 
of the policy, they are also dispositive instruments in and of themselves as well. Therefore, 
because these documents reference the "Insurance Manual," the District Court was correct in 
finding the manual to be a "governing instrument" and its decision should be upheld. 
II. The Insurance Manual and Master Policy Documents Relied Upon by the 
District Court in Granting Mary Beth's Motion for Summary Judgment Had 
Foundation and Were Properly Authenticated, 
Appellant raises two issues in their argument: first that the court improperly allowed an 
"Insurance Manual" into evidence without authenticating the manual; and second, the court also 
erred by not finding that there was a lack of foundation for the manual. Appellant is wrong on 
both issues as will be discussed below. 
As to the issue of authentication, Rule 902 of the Utah Rules of Evidence indicates that 
certain forms of evidence are self-authenticating. Section (5) indicates that official publications 
like books, pamphlets, or other publication purporting to be issued by a public authority are self-
authenticating. See Utah Rule of Evidence 902(5). Therefore, documents published on the 
website of a public authority are self-authenticating because they are reliable. 
In the present case, the manual and all other documents submitted to the court were 
obtained from the Office of Personal Management ("OPM") website and are still readily 
available to the public at their site. OPM is a public authority that handles the administration of 
benefits for federal employees. Therefore, the insurance manual and all other insurance forms 
6 
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obtained from OPM's website were properly self-authenticated and the District Court did not err 
by accepting them. 
As to the issue of foundation, Counsel for Appellee also submitted an Affidavit indicating 
where the evidence was obtained. See (R. 254.) In the Affidavit, Counsel explains that he went to 
the OPM website and downloaded forms thereon. Counsel also indicates that he had 
conversations with two OPM employees. Through those conversations, it was indicated that 
FEGLI participants are not issued individual policies, but are referred to a Policy Handbook, 
which was then obtained from the OPM website. Further, in an email sent to Counsel from a 
FEGLI employee, Counsel was provided with a copy of the master policy and was also informed 
that any changes that have ever occurred on the policy are published via letter on the OPM 
website. These changes to the policy were also downloaded from the OPM website and 
submitted as exhibits, these updates would also be self-authenticating under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 902(5). (R. 126-.) Taking into account that most of the information provided to court 
by counsel is readily available online, his affidavit would be sufficient to lay a foundation upon 
which the court could reasonably accept the documents for what counsel purported them to be. 
To further elaborate the point, it seems like Rhonda objects to anything less than a FEGLI 
employee literally flying to Utah just to testify that the manual they previous sent in an email is 
thee policy and the same policy in effect when Dan Malloy signed his application. Because such 
a request is unreasonably onerous, the trial judge was well within his discretion to accept Mary 
Beth's counsel's affidavit to provide a proper foundation for the policy, manual, and other 
documents previously mentioned. Further, there was enough supporting evidence to prove that 
the policy and manual submitted where substantively the same as what Dan Malloy signed and 
that such evidence could reasonably be relied upon by the court. Therefore, no evidentiary errors 
7 
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occurred. However, even if there were admissibility problems, any problems would not undo the 
ultimate end result as will be indicated in greater detail below in Mary Beth's argument relating 
to preemption. 
III. The Governing Instruments of the Policy Contain Express Language Preventing 
the Automatic Revocation by Divorce Provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-
804. 
Even assuming that the insurance manual is inadmissible, Appellant agrees that the 
policy and the beneficiary designation form are governing instruments. On the beneficiary 
designation form, it expressly indicates in a large enclosed box the following: "Designations 
should be kept current. With changes in family status (marriage, divorce, death, births, etc.), you 
may wish to make changes in designation." (R. 178-179.) The form recognizes that divorce 
might necessitate a change in beneficiary, but only if the insured wishes a change. Further, the 
form also indicates under the section "Regulations", part (f), that the only way that the 
designation of beneficiary is automatically cancelled is if the employee stops being insured. 
However, more blatantly apparent and obvious that an automatic revocation does not 
occur is found in the Manual; thus it explains Rhonda's desperate attempt to eliminate it from 
evidence. The Manual contains an entire section devoted to this issue. Under the title, 
"Importance of Updating Designations", it clearly states, 
It is your responsibility to ensure that your Designation of Beneficiary remains 
accurate and reflects your intentions. You should be aware that benefits will be 
paid based on a valid Designation, regardless of whether that Designation still 
reflects your intentions. 
A divorce does not invalidate a Designation that names your former spouse as 
beneficiary. 
See FEGLI Handbook, Chapter on Order of Precedence and Designation of Beneficiary. 
http://www.opm.gOv/insure/life/reference/handbook/designt2.asp#designation of beneficiary. (R. 
8 
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76-.) Because of this express language, automatic revision does not occur under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-2-804 even if the Utah statute was not preempted from applying to a FEGLI policy. 
Therefore, the trial judge's holding stating such should be upheld because it was correct. 
IV, Even if FEGLI Policies Fall Within Utah's Definitions of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-
804, Application of the Statute to FEGLI Policies is Preempted by Federal Law. 
Notwithstanding all previous arguments made, perhaps the most important issue before 
the Court in this matter is that FEGLIA is an inflexible statutory scheme which preempts Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-2-804 inasmuch as it attempts to give force and effect to a beneficiary other than 
the one designated by Dan Malloy. Rhonda cites O'Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437,1440 (11th 
Cir. 1988) for the argument that the goal of FEGLIA is merely just to achieve administrative 
convenience and avoid delay. It is baffling that Rhonda would fail to realize that in the same 
case, the 11th Circuit studied at length the intent of Congress and determined that the purpose of 
FEGLIA's preemption was not merely for convenience, but also "for the benefit of designated 
beneficiaries" and that it establishes "an inflexible rule that the beneficiary designated in 
accordance with the statute would receive policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or 
equities in a particular case." Id. This highlights one of the courts preliminary remarks that "[a]n 
insured's designation of beneficiary under the Federal Employees1 Group Life Insurance Act 
(FEGLIA) prevails for all purposes." Id. at 1437. This would be true even in circumstances that 
might appear to have a harsh result. See id. 
Even the preemption provision of FEGLIA states that it preempts "any contract under 
this chapter which relate to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits, (including payments with 
respect to benefits) . . . "5 U.S.C.A. § 8709. The purpose of preemption is not, as Plaintiff argues, 
merely to ensure convenience in administration and efficiency of plans as it might have been in 
the ERISA context as in the case cited by Rhonda, In re Estate of Paul J. Sauers, III Deceased, 
9 
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971 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Sup. 2009), which has since been reversed for largely the same reasons be 
explained right now. See In re Estate ofPaulJ. Sauers, III Deceased, 32 A. 3d 1241 (Pa. 2011). 
The purpose of preemption is primarily because it also entails making sure that beneficiaries 
receive the full force and effect of a life insurance program controlled exclusively by the federal 
government for the benefit of employees. 
A state law that attempts to alter ownership of the proceeds cannot avoid preemption 
even where it waits until after they are received by a duly appointed beneficiary. FEGLIA makes 
this purpose clear in § 8705(a) by commanding that the proceeds "shall be paid according to the 
order of precedence," and by emphasizing that "a designation... of a beneficiary in a . . . 
document not so executed and filed has no force or effect" {emphasis added).5 U.S.C. § 
8705(a). Additionally, a state law which attempts to restrict or waive the right to change 
beneficiary designations automatically by reason of divorce would be in direct conflict with 
FEGLIA. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 870.802(f) (formerly codified as 5 C.F.R. § 870.902(e); see 
also Ward v. Strattonf 988 R2d 65 (8th Cir. 1993). 
Plaintiffs have attempted to claim that a state action is allowed to redistribute proceeds 
received from FEGLIA by filing a suit directly against the beneficiary after the distribution has 
occurred. However, the 10th Circuit has indicated that a state's attempt to alter federal law by 
reallocating FEGLI proceeds is preempted regardless of the equities in a particular case. See 
Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948,949 fh. 4 (10th Cir.) cert denied, 493 U.S. 1011,110 S.Ct. 574, 
107 L.Ed. 2d 549 (1989). Further, the case cited by Rhonda, In re Estate ofPaulJ. Sauers, III 
Deceased, 971 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Sup. 2009), used to support her argument that a private right of 
action is created by Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804 even if a plan administrator gives the proceeds 
to the designated beneficiary that also happens to be an ex-spouse, has now been reversed. See In 
10 
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re Estate o/PauIJ. Sauers, III, Deceased, 32 A.3d 1241 (Pa. 2011). In its reversal opinion, the 
Pennsylvannia Supreme Court found that a contrary result would cause havoc for plan 
administrators having to educate themselves in state laws to avoid potential liability for violating 
federal law and thereby cause administrative inefficiency and allow states to impermissibly 
affect federal law. See generally Sauers, 32 A.3d at 1257. 
It should also be pointed out, that even though the Sauers case is distinguishable from the 
present set off facts because it relates to ERISA instead of FEGLIA, the state of Pennsylvania 
has now come into agreement with other federal circuit courts finding that federal law cannot be 
preempted by state laws changing designation of beneficiaries. See Sauers, 32 A.3d 1241 (Pa. 
2011); see also O'Neal, 839 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1988); Dean v. Johnson, 881F.2d 948 (10th 
Cir. 1989). 
As for the second case cited by Rhonda, Stillman v. TIAA-CREF, 343 F.3d 1311 (10th 
Cir. 2003), although the case is dealing with Utah Code § 75-2-804(2) and how it is applied 
retroactively to policies entered into before the automatic revision statute was enacted in 1998, it 
does not address the issue of the effect of § 75-2-804 as to altering a designation of a beneficiary 
in a federal policy like FEGLI. Therefore, although it is a good case about how Utah Code § 75-
2-804 functions in general, it is not on point or helpful to the present set of facts when dealing 
with a FEGLI policy. Further, following the thought line presented by Rhonda using this case as 
the proposed authority to allow Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804 to alter FEGLI designation of 
beneficiaries would go against the position of 10th and 11th Circuits. 
Therefore, unfortunately for Rhonda, her authority for her position is completely 
undermined by the very same cases she cited and the conclusion ultimately does not allow her 
not escape the end result proclaimed in Dean v. Johnson, that, Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-804 
11 
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"restricts the federal insured's right to designate a beneficiary and thus cannot be valid under 
FEGLIA. No other circumstances of payment can override this principle." Dean, 881 F.2d at 
949. Therefore, for the sake of argument that even if there are problematic evidentiary issues, the 
district court's end result could not end any differently than summarily finding in favor of Mary 
Beth. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals should uphold the district court's 
conclusions that Mary Beth was the beneficiary of the Policy and that her divorce from Dan 
Malloy did not automatically revoke the designation of beneficiary. The Court of Appeals should 
also uphold the district court's conclusion that the insurance policy, in the insurance manual and 
the beneficiary election form were governing instruments. Further, the Court of Appeals should 
find that the insurance policy and manual were properly self-authenticated and there was 
sufficient foundation for the district court to accept them into evidence. Finally, the Court of 
Appeals should find that Utah Code Ann. 75-2-804 is preempted by federal law and does not 
apply to Dan Malloy's FEGLI policy. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of March, 2012. 
LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN BACHISON 
Jonathaft^Bachison 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of March, 2012,1 caused a true and correct copy of 




PIA ANDERSON DORIUS & MOSS 
222 S. Main St. STE 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2194 
Bachison 
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ADDENDUM 
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5 USC §8705 
(a)Except as provided in subsection (e), the amount of group life insurance and group accidental 
death insurance in force on an employee at the date of his death shall be paid, on the 
establishment of a valid claim, to the person or persons surviving at the date of his death, in the 
following order of precedence: 
First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in a signed and witnessed 
writing received before death in the employing office or, if insured because of receipt of annuity 
or of benefits under subchapter I of chapter 81 of this title as provided by section 8706(b) of this 
title, in the Office of Personnel Management. For this purpose, a designation, change, or 
cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other document not so executed and filed has no force or 
effect. 
Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the widow or widower of the employee. 
Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of the employee and descendants of deceased 
children by representation. 
Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of the employee or the survivor of them. 
Fifth, if none of the above, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the estate of the 
employee. 
Sixth, if none of the above, to other next of kin of the employee entitled under the laws of the 
domicile of the employee at the date of his death. 
(b)If, within 1 year after the death of the employee, no claim for payment has been filed by a 
person entitled under the order of precedence named by subsection (a) of this section, or if 
payment to the person within that period is prohibited by Federal statute or regulation, payment 
may be made in the order of precedence as if the person had predeceased the employee, and the 
payment bars recovery by any other person. 
(c)If, within 2 years after the death of the employee, no claim for payment has been filed by a 
person entitled under the order of precedence named by subsection (a) of this section, and neither 
the Office nor the administrative office established by the company concerned pursuant to 
section 8709(b) of this title has received notice that such a claim will be made, payment may be 
made to the claimant who in the judgment of the Office is equitably entitled thereto, and the 
payment bars recovery by any other person. 
(d)If, within 4 years after the death of the employee, payment has not been made under this 
section and no claim for payment by a person entitled under this section is pending, the amount 
payable escheats to the credit of the Employees' Life Insurance Fund. 
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(e) 
(l)Any amount which would otherwise be paid to a person determined under the order of 
precedence named by subsection (a) shall be paid (in whole or in part) by the Office to another 
person if and to the extent expressly provided for in the terms of any court decree of divorce, 
annulment, or legal separation, or the terms of any court order or court-approved property 
settlement agreement incident to any court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation. 
(2)For purposes of this subsection, a decree, order, or agreement referred to in paragraph (1) 
shall not be effective unless it is received, before the date of the covered employee's death, by 
the employing agency or, if the employee has separated from service, by the Office. 
(3)A designation under this subsection with respect to any person may not be changed except— 
(A)with the written consent of such person, if received as described in paragraph (2); or 
(B)by modification of the decree, order, or agreement, as the case may be, if received as 
described in paragraph (2). 
(4)The Office shall prescribe any regulations necessary to carry out this subsection, including 
regulations for the application of this subsection in the event that two or more decrees, orders, or 
agreements, are received with respect to the same amount. 
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51LS.C.§8709 
(a) The Office of Personnel Management, without regard to section 5 of title 41, may purchase 
from one or more life insurance companies a policy or policies of group life and accidental death 
and dismemberment insurance to provide the benefits specified by this chapter. A company must 
meet the following requirements: 
(1) It must be licensed to transact life and accidental death and dismemberment insurance under 
the laws of 48 of the States and the District of Columbia. 
(2) It must have in effect, on the most recent December 31 for which information is available to 
the Office, an amount of employee group life insurance equal to at least 1 percent of the total 
amount of employee group life insurance in the United States in all life insurance companies. 
(b) A company issuing a policy under subsection (a) of this section shall establish an 
administrative office under a name approved by the Office. 
(c) The Office at any time may discontinue a policy purchased a company under subsection (a) 
of this section. 
(d)(1) The provisions of any contract under this chapter which relate to the nature or extent of 
coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt 
any law of any State or political subdivision thereof, or any regulation issued thereunder, which 
relates to group life insurance to the extent that the law or regulation is inconsistent with the 
contractual provisions. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, "State" means a State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and a territory or possession of the United States. 
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5 C.F.R. § 870.802 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (i) of this section, if an insured individual wants benefits 
paid differently from the order of precedence, he/she must file a designation of beneficiary. A 
designation of beneficiary cannot be filed by anyone other than the insured individual. 
Exception: if the insurance has been assigned under subpart I of this part, the insured individual 
cannot designate a beneficiary; only the assignee(s) can designate beneficiaries. 
(b) A designation of beneficiary must be in writing, signed by the insured individual, and 
witnessed and signed by 2 people. The completed designation of beneficiary form may be 
submitted to the appropriate office via appropriate methods approved by the employing office. 
The appropriate office must receive the designation before the death of the insured. 
(1) For an employee, the appropriate office is the employing office. 
(2) For an annuitant or compensationer, the appropriate office is OPM. 
(c) A designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or any other document not 
witnessed and filed as required by this section has no legal effect with respect to benefits under 
this chapter. 
(d) A witness to a designation of beneficiary cannot be named as a beneficiary. 
(e) Any individual, firm, corporation, or legal entity can be named as a beneficiary, except an 
agency of the Federal or District of Columbia Government. 
(f) An insured individual (or an assignee) may change his/her beneficiary at any time without the 
knowledge or consent of the previous beneficiary. This right cannot be waived or restricted. 
(g) (1) A designation of beneficiary is automatically cancelled 31 days after the individual stops 
being insured. 
(2) An assignment under subpart I of this part automatically cancels an insured individual's 
designation of beneficiary. 
(h) An insured individual may provide that a designated beneficiary is entitled to the insurance 
benefits only if the beneficiary survives him/her for a specified period of time (not more than 30 
days). If the beneficiary doesn't survive for the specified period, insurance benefits will be paid 
as if the beneficiary had died before the insured. 
(i) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (i)(2) of this section, if a court order has been received in 
accordance with § 870.801(d), an insured individual cannot designate a different beneficiary, 
unless 
(i) The person(s) named in the court order gives written consent for the change, or 
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(ii) The court order is modified. 
(2) If a court order has been received in accordance with § 870.801(d), and the court order 
applies to only part of the insurance benefits, an insured individual can designate a different 
beneficiary to receive the insurance benefits that are not included under the court order. If the 
insured individual does not make a designation for these benefits and there is no previous valid 
designation on file, benefits will be paid according to the order of precedence shown in § 
870.801(a). 
(3) If a court order received in accordance with § 870.801(d) is subsequently modified without 
naming a new person to receive the benefits, and a certified copy of the modified court order is 
received by the appropriate office before the death of the insured, the insured individual can 
designate a beneficiary. Benefits will be paid according to the order of precedence shown in § 
870.801(d) if the insured individual does not complete a new designation of beneficiary. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 902 Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating 
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of 
authenticity in order to be admitted: 
(1) Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed. A document that bears: 
(A) a seal purporting to be that of the United States; any state, district, commonwealth, 
territory, or insular possession of the United States; the former Panama Canal Zone; the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands; a political subdivision of any of these entities; or a department, 
agency, or officer of any entity named above; and 
(B) a sigiature purporting to be an execution or attestation. 
(2) Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed But Are Signed and Certified. A 
document that bears no seal if: 
(A) it bears the signature of an officer or employee of an entity named in Rule 902(1)(A); and 
(B) another public officer who has a seal and official duties within that same entity certifies 
under seal — or its equivalent — that the signer has the official capacity and that the signature is 
genuine. 
(3) Foreign Public Documents. A document that purports to be signed or attested by a person 
who is authorized by a foreign country's law to do so. The document must be accompanied by a 
final certification that certifies the genuineness of the signature and official position of the signer 
or attester — or of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness relates to the signature or 
attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness relating to the signature or attestation. 
The certification may be made by a secretary of a United States embassy or legation; by a consul 
general, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States; or by a diplomatic or consular 
official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If all parties have been 
given a reasonable opportunity to investigate the document's authenticity and accuracy, the court 
may, for good cause, either: 
(A) order that it be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification; or 
(B) allow it to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification. 
(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official record — or a copy of a document 
that was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law — if the copy is certified as 
correct by: 
(A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the certification; or 
(B) a certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), or any law of the United States or of 
this state. 
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(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlet, or other publication purporting to be issued by 
public authority. 
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals. Printed material purporting to be a newspaper or periodical. 
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like. An inscription, sign, tag, or label purporting to have been 
affixed in the course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control. 
(8) Acknowledged Documents. A document accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment 
that is lawfully executed by a notary public or another officer who is authorized to take 
acknowledgments. 
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Commercial paper, a signature on it, and related 
documents, to the extent allowed by general commercial law. 
(10) Presumptions Under a Federal Statute. A signature, document, or anything else that a 
federal statute declares to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic. 
(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The original or a copy of a 
domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification 
of the custodian or another qualified person that must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, 
would subject the signer to criminal penalty under the laws where the certification was signed. 
Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written notice of 
the intent to offer the record — and must make the record and certification available for 
inspection — so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them. 
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The original or a copy of a 
foreign record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of 
the custodian or another qualified person that must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, 
would subject the signer to criminal penalty under the laws where the certification was signed. 
Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written notice of 
the intent to offer the record — and must make the record and certification available for 
inspection — so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of the 
restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and 
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. 
There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the 
federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The amendment to Rule 803(6) and the addition of Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were made to 
track the changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the adoption of Federal Rules 
902(11) and 902(12), effective December 1,2000. The changes to the federal rules benefit from 
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a federal statute allowing the use of declarations without notarization. Utah has no comparable 
statute, so the requirements for declarations used under the rule are included within the rule 
itself. 
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